

Security Council

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Letter dated 11 October 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire, and in accordance with paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 2101 (2013), I have the honour to transmit herewith the midterm report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) **Gert Rosenthal**
Chair

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire



Letter dated 16 September 2013 from the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004)

The members of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire have the honour to transmit herewith the midterm report of the Group, prepared in accordance with paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 2101 (2013).

The Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire

(Signed) Raymond Debelle

(Signed) Eugene Fatakanwa

(Signed) Joel Salek

(Signed) Roberto Sollazzo

(Signed) Manuel Vázquez-Boidard

Midterm report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 2101 (2013)

I. Introduction

1. In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 11 July 2013 (S/2013/416), the Secretary-General announced his appointment of five members of the Group of Experts, as follows: Raymond DeBelle (Belgium, arms), Eugene Rutabingwa Fatakanwa (Rwanda, customs/transport), Joel Salek (Colombia, finance), Roberto Sollazzo (Italy, diamonds) and Manuel Vázquez-Boidard (Spain, regional). In the same letter, the Secretary-General also designated Mr. Vázquez-Boidard to serve as the Coordinator of the Group.
2. The Group of Experts commenced its work in the field on 25 July 2013. During the reporting period, the Group met with Member States, international and regional organizations and government authorities in Côte d'Ivoire with a view to obtaining information relevant to its investigations. To date, the Group has visited Belgium and France in addition to conducting field visits throughout Côte d'Ivoire. A list of the meetings and consultations held by the Group is provided in annex 1 to the present report.
3. At the time of writing, the Group's views regarding the political and security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, as expressed in its final report submitted pursuant to resolution 2045 (2012) (S/2013/228, paras. 4-8), remain valid. Moreover, as the Ivorian economy continues to grow rapidly and the country's armed forces are readjusted through the development of the military capacity of the special forces units (see para. 5 below), the Group continues to be concerned about the expansion of the power of the leaders of the former Forces nouvelles opposition. The Group notes that the country's efforts to combat impunity remain in abeyance, as none of the former Forces nouvelles leaders have been indicted to date for the crimes committed between 2002 and 2011. Moreover, the Group is of the view that the former zone commanders have amassed additional sources of finance that, in the event of a deterioration in the political and security situation, could be used to purchase weapons and related materiel in violation of the sanctions regime.
4. In connection with paragraph 7 of resolution 2101 (2013), by which the Security Council decided to further review the measures decided in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of the resolution in the light of the progress achieved in the stabilization throughout the country, by 30 April 2014, with a view to possibly further modifying or lifting all or part of the remaining measures, in accordance with progress achieved in relation to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform, national reconciliation and the fight against impunity, the Group of Experts is closely monitoring developments and intends to present, in its final report, due in April 2014, a thorough assessment of the progress made in connection with those four pillars.
5. The Group is of the view that the process of security sector reform is gradually leading to a readjustment of the Ivorian armed forces with the rapid strengthening, in terms both of human resources and materiel, of the special forces units (i.e. Centre de coordination des décisions opérationnelles (CCDO), Force de recherche et d'action de la police (FRAP), Groupement de la sécurité présidentielle

(GSPR), Garde républicaine (GR) and Groupement des forces spéciales (GFS)). Former zone commanders exert effective power over the CCDO, GSPR and GR. For instance, Cherif Ousmane is the second in command of GSPR and Issiaka Ouattara (alias "Wattao") is the second in command of CCDO.

6. On the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, the Group considers that it is unlikely that the Government is in a position to meet the objectives set out in resolution 2112 (2013), namely, the disarmament and reintegration of 30,000 former combatants by the end of 2013. According to reliable sources, on 5 September, 9,422 soldiers were demobilized and 9,600 weapons collected. The Group observes that the zone commanders continue to have strong leverage in the process, as they identify the soldiers to be taken into account in demobilization and disarmament operations. The zone commanders are thereby capable of maintaining control over military networks inside and outside the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) for the benefit of their own financial, military and political interests. The Group is concerned, as those structures have an impact on the management of the security situation and do not systematically report through the FRCI chain of command.

7. The weapons and related materiel transferred to northern Côte d'Ivoire in the aftermath of the post-electoral crisis continue to be a major source of concern to the Group. The Group is currently investigating whether weapons contained in the arsenals reported in its April 2013 report (S/2013/228, para. 75) have since been removed from their locations. It intends to inform the Committee on its findings, as appropriate.

8. Notwithstanding the notable decline in security incidents in Côte d'Ivoire, the Group remains concerned that large quantities of weapons and related ammunition are still unaccounted for and are also at risk of being illegally transferred to other States in the subregion (see S/2013/228, para. 63).

II. Investigation methodology

9. The Group prioritized field-based investigations throughout Côte d'Ivoire, especially along the country's borders with neighbouring States. It also reviewed documentary evidence provided by local, regional, national and international organizations and private companies.

10. During each of its investigations, the Group sought incontrovertible documentary evidence to support its findings, including physical evidence, such as markings on arms and ammunition. When such specific evidence was not available, the Group required at least two independent and credible sources to substantiate a finding.

11. The Group conducted investigations in each of its mandated fields to assess potential violations of relevant Security Council sanctions.

12. As it moves forward in the implementation of the mandate, the Group wishes to point out that its annual communications budget is not sufficiently resourced to allow it to conduct important investigations, notably those related to follow-up of the activities of militia and mercenary groups (present in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Liberia).

III. Compliance with the Group's requests for information

13. During the first part of its mandate, the Group addressed a number of official communications to Member States, international organizations, private entities and individuals, and intends to fully report on the replies received in its final report.

IV. Sanctions-related regional issues

14. The economic recovery in Côte d'Ivoire and relative stability in the country have had a positive impact on neighbouring States such as Liberia and Ghana, and especially in such inland countries as Mali and Burkina Faso. The Group notes that continued efforts led by the Ivorian authorities have achieved progress in stabilizing the security situation between Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Ghana. However, security incidents, particularly along the border with Liberia, and social and ethnic tensions in western Côte d'Ivoire, are a continuing source of concern.

15. The ongoing political and military developments in Mali have an important impact on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, with a significant ethnic Malian community residing in the country, and in the past the Group has received reliable information of weapons trafficking at the border between Côte d'Ivoire and Mali (see S/2012/196, para. 21). As President of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Alassane Ouattara, President of Côte d'Ivoire, engaged in important political efforts to stabilize the situation in Mali. Côte d'Ivoire has resumed its stabilization role in the subregion and in May assigned a contingent to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

16. Notwithstanding this progress, the Group remains concerned about the large quantities of weapons and related ammunition that continue to circulate in Côte d'Ivoire and about the prospect of those weapons being trafficked to Mali and other States in the subregion should their respective political situations deteriorate.

V. Cooperation with stakeholders

17. Issues related to the Group's cooperation with stakeholders in Côte d'Ivoire, namely the Government and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), are highlighted below.

A. Cooperation with the Panel of Experts on Liberia

18. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 2101 (2013), the Group maintained a consistent working relationship with the Panel of Experts on Liberia through the regular exchange of information.

B. Cooperation with Ivorian authorities

19. During the first part of its mandate, the Group held meetings with relevant Ivorian authorities, including Prime Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan, and noted the Government's awareness of the sanctions regime as well as its readiness to

cooperate fully with the Group. In its final report, the Group will assess the effectiveness of the cooperation of the Ivorian authorities.

C. Cooperation with the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

20. The Group wishes to express its appreciation for the valuable support provided by UNOCI during the first part of its mandate. The mission continues to make offices, transport and administrative support available to successive Groups of Experts. Its Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit provides logistical support to the Group and shares important information related to the embargo, in particular data concerning ammunition and materiel that appear to have entered Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the sanctions regime. The administrative support provided by the Unit also continues to be excellent.

VI. Arms

21. In accordance with resolution 2101 (2013), the Group continued its investigations on the implementation of the sanctions regime in Côte d'Ivoire and intends to provide the sanctions committee with a complete analysis of its findings in its final report.

22. To date, the Group has noted that the frequency and the extent of security incidents have diminished throughout Côte d'Ivoire. Nevertheless, isolated incidents continue. According to reliable interlocutors, an attack conducted on 1 July between Ferkessedougou and Kong (northern Côte d'Ivoire) against Fidèle Sarasoro, Chief of Autorité pour le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réintégration, was carried out by trained military personnel.

23. On 26 August, during a meeting with the Group of Experts, the Minister of Defence highlighted the progress achieved by the authorities in dismantling the network of Dozos (traditional hunters) as well as the numerous informal checkpoints throughout Côte d'Ivoire. The Group was able to verify that along the main roads and avenues of Abidjan, the number of checkpoints has consistently decreased. During its field visits, however, the Group identified 25 checkpoints between Abidjan and San Pedro and 10 between Abidjan and Noé (on the border with Ghana). In its final report, the Group intends to present an updated and detailed map describing the checkpoints in Côte d'Ivoire.

24. In the context of identifying the ammunition present in the territory of Côte d'Ivoire in violation (or possible violation) of the sanctions regime, the Group conveys its appreciation to the work of the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit for having prepared a comprehensive table (see annex 2), which may also serve Member States and relevant organizations in helping the Group to identify entities that have funded, planned and organized operations in violation of the arms embargo.

A. Readjustment of the Ivorian security sector

25. During the present mandate, the Group intends to provide the Committee with a complete evaluation of the security sector reform programme currently under way in Côte d'Ivoire. At the time of writing, the security sector reform process has been

formally engaged. The Group is of the view, however, that, at this stage security sector reform is limited to a readjustment of the Ivorian security sector rather than genuine reform.

B. Soldiers not integrated in the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire

26. In its previous reports, the Group observed that the financial networks operated by zone commanders continued to exist and to have an impact within FRCI, where commanders have been appointed. In August, the Group conducted interviews of soldiers not-integrated in FRCI who were located in Abidjan. The soldiers had generally retained their weapons and ammunition and were working as security guards in the private sector; they were also called upon to participate in official FRCI operations when so requested, acting as a military reserve. Individuals interviewed by the Group reported that while its personnel were in barracks, FRCI provided for accommodation and food and, when employed by others as security guards, they received a monthly salary of an average of \$100.

27. The Group is also aware of the practice of various FRCI commanders of paying a certain amount monthly to the same non-integrated soldiers. The Group intends to continue investigating this issue and will report accordingly in its final report.

28. In this context, even the Chief of Operations of the Centre de coordination des décisions opérationnelles, Issiaka Ouattara, alias "Wattao" (former zone commander of Seguéla), confirmed in an interview to a local newspaper (see annex 3) that in his unit, in fact, the best trained elements were not regularized in FRCI.

29. At present, there is a parallel military structure in Côte d'Ivoire within the regular FRCI that is the backbone of the security system in terms of a possible effective intervention. The Group is concerned that this military structure, while mixed with the regular structures, may have the capacity to purchase more weapons and related materiel in the event of a crisis, as needed, in violation of the sanctions regime.

C. Violations of the sanctions regime

30. On 19 and 24 April, in Danané and Sinématiali, respectively, the UNOCI Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit observed non-lethal grenade launchers AM-600 (37-38 mm) and AM-640 (40 mm) (for, e.g., tear gas) and related ammunition manufactured by Condor Non-Lethal Technologies (registered in Brazil) (see annex 4). Some of the observed weapons and associated ammunition bear markings indicating that they were produced in August 2012. Those weapons and related ammunition were again documented on 15 and 16 May in Boundiali. On 7 May, non-lethal ammunition for the same grenade launchers, also produced in 2012, was observed in Danané by the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit.

31. The Group was informed by the Brazilian authorities on 13 September that a sale of the above-mentioned non-lethal weapons and related ammunition had been concluded in 2012 with the office of the *État major particulier* of the Presidency of Burkina Faso (see annex 5). An end-user certificate, specifying that any re-export is subject to authorization by the Brazilian authorities, accompanied the sale. The

Group noted that two types of weapons, the AM-600 and AM-640, as well as ammunition model GL-302, SS-601 and AM-500, which are reflected in the invoice documents, have been observed in Côte d'Ivoire.

32. This materiel and related ammunition were imported to Côte d'Ivoire before April 2013 and therefore should have been disclosed to the Committee, in accordance with paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 2045 (2012), by which the Council decided that the Committee should be notified in advance of supplies of non-lethal law enforcement equipment intended to enable the Ivorian security forces. The Group continues its investigations concerning the parties involved in this violation of the sanctions regime and intends to inform the Committee as appropriate.

D. Lethal and related materiel

33. On 26 August 2013, the Group visited the headquarters of FRCI in Abidjan and observed that the AK-47 type rifles carried by military personnel were equipped with new magazines made of synthetic material. This materiel had never been observed before in Côte d'Ivoire. The Group is investigating whether those magazines are part of the materiel described in an exemption request transmitted by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to the sanctions committee on 28 August and 5 September. The Group is concerned that part of the materiel listed in the request may have been already delivered to Côte d'Ivoire, and will report accordingly to the Committee on its findings.

34. In the above-mentioned request, the Ivorian authorities requested an exemption to acquire a combat Mi-24 helicopter, two RG12 armoured personnel carriers and 3,000 AK-47s, 1,500 non-specified 9-mm pistols, a large amount of related ammunition, optoelectronic material and tactical equipment, including ballistic protection material.

35. The Group has conveyed a letter to the Committee expressing concern that the Mi-24 combat helicopter, as a strategic weapon, features rapid-fire heavy machine gun or twin-barrelled 23-mm canon and armaments carried under its wings, usually pods with unguided rockets, 57-calibre (S-5) or 80 mm (S-8). The helicopter can also carry several guided anti-tank missiles or general-purpose bombs (four 250-kg or two 500-kg bombs) and featuring a seating capacity of only eight passengers, is therefore equipped for a conventional warfare environment. Furthermore, the Group notes that by importing such materiel, together with maintenance requirements (technicians and spare parts), the Ivorian armed forces would be in a position to service and further repair its existing Mi-24 helicopter, registered TU-VHO (see S/2011/271, paras. 336-358), which the Group has considered to be a violation of the arms embargo.

36. On 21 March, the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit observed the delivery at Abidjan seaport of eight packages containing multiple semi-rigid boats sold to the Ministry of Defence by the company MagForce (registered in France), which was documented by the Group in 2012 as a violation of the sanctions regime (see S/2012/196, para. 77). The Group notes that the contract for that materiel was in fact signed on 23 November 2012, under the sanctions regime adopted in resolution 2045 (2012), and reflects the purchase of two Sillinger model 470 UM and eight Zodiac MK3 Grand Raid boats, all equipped with 40-cv engines (see annex 6).

E. Non-lethal materiel

37. On 18 March, the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit observed the arrival, at Abidjan international airport, of a large shipment of body armour items supplied by the company Plasan Sasa (registered in Israel). This shipment, weighing five tons, was for the Ivorian National Security Council under the jurisdiction of the Presidency (see annex 7). The Group intends to continue its investigations concerning this particular case and looks forward to receiving a reply from Plasan Sasa to its letter of 6 August in that regard.

38. The bill of lading related to this shipment and the markings observed on the shipping pallets indicate the involvement of the company Horsforth T., which is mentioned in the previous section concerning the exemption request of 5 September.

39. On 12 April, the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit also observed the arrival at the Abidjan seaport of a large quantity of military equipment, including 60,000 pairs of military boots, delivered by the company E&C Technology (registered in China). The recipient was the Ministry of Defence (see annex 8). The company had been already named as having contravened the sanctions regime in 2013 (S/2013/228, para. 94).

F. Ammunition with characteristics similar to Sudanese production

40. On 24 April and 13 May, the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit observed various materiel produced after 2004 (in violation of the arms embargo) at an inspection of the Republican Guard site in Treichville, Abidjan, that likely entered the country in violation of the sanctions regime.

41. The materiel included some 30 crates of 120-mm mortar rounds with marks indicating that the mortars had been manufactured in the Sudan in 2011, and one crate of 60-mm mortar rounds produced in 2008 (see annex 9).

G. Unmarked 7.62 x 54-mm ammunition

42. Since January 2012, UNOCI had observed approximately 700 rounds of copper-based, unmarked 7.62 x 54-mm ammunition among ammunition collected as part of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, as well as during inspections at two FRCI sites in Abidjan. This includes the documentation of some 450 such rounds in unlabelled black polythene bags at Camp Commando in Abobo, Abidjan, on 6 September.

43. The Group noted the unevenly applied neck sealant (yellow) and primer sealant (red) on several rounds of the unmarked rounds. Unlabelled black polythene bags and unevenly applied yellow neck sealant and red primer sealant on copper-based cartridges are all consistent with ammunition produced in the Sudan since at least 2010. Further, the Sudan is the only country at present that is known to produce ammunition with those characteristics.

44. There are two additional elements that support the likely Sudanese origin of these ammunition rounds. First, also present at Camp Commando were copper-based 7.62 x 39-mm rounds with unevenly applied yellow neck and red primer sealant in unlabelled black polythene bags. These rounds bore production marks consistent

with those used by the Sudan for ammunition produced in 2010 and 2011. Second, present at Camp Commando, as well as at Camp Gallieni in Plateau, Abidjan, during an inspection on 22 February were loose, unmarked 7.62 x 54-mm rounds together with 7.62 x 54-mm rounds with production marks for the Sudan, 2011 (S/2013/228, para. 46 and annex 7).

45. The Group considers that there was a deliberate attempt to conceal fundamental information on the ammunition and that the absence of cartridge markings and identifying data on the packaging are possible indications that the ammunition was produced and packaged with the intent to hide its origins (see annex 10).

H. Ammunition with characteristics similar to that produced in China

46. On 13 May, the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit documented two crates of M-6 fuses for 82-mm mortar bombs during an inspection at the Republican Guard site at Treichville, Abidjan, with marks identifying the fuses as having been produced in China in 2009 (see annex 11).

47. On both crates, the markings had been painted over in an apparent attempt to hide the origin of the contents. The paint was removed with sandpaper, revealing the words "Yarmouk Industrial Complex" and the contract number 09XSD14E01YIC/SU.

48. The information is consistent with military equipment exported by the Chinese company Xinshidai (identified by "XSD" in the contract number) to the Yarmouk Industrial Complex in the Sudan (identified by YIC/SU in the contract number).

49. The Group cannot, therefore, exclude the prospect that the presence of the ammunition in Côte d'Ivoire is, in fact, the result of a diversion of a legitimate State-to-State transfer of military equipment from China to the Sudan, and will continue to investigate this case.

I. Shipment of pistols from Glock

50. The Group refers to paragraphs 88 and 89 of its final report of 17 April (S/2013/228), in which it described a shipment of Glock-19 and Glock-26 model pistols as a flagrant violation of the sanctions regime.

51. After a careful re-examination of all available information, the Group of Experts has revised its analysis and highlights that the above-mentioned shipment fully respected the procedures of exemption as imposed by the Security Council and hence cannot be considered as a violation of the sanctions regime.

VII. Finance

52. Part of the Group's mandate is to examine sources of funding for arms purchases, as set out in paragraph 7 (b) of resolution 1727 (2006), in which the Security Council directed the Group to investigate the sources of financing, including from the exploitation of natural resources in Côte d'Ivoire, for purchases of arms and related materiel and activities.

A. Economy of Côte d'Ivoire

53. The gross domestic product (GDP) of Côte d'Ivoire increased 9.8 per cent in 2012 (surpassing the expected 8.6 per cent announced in September 2012) owing to a large extent to a substantial increase in foreign public and private investment and the economy's overall recovery. The Government announced its intention to continue the reform process begun in 2011 with a view to strengthening good governance and transparency in public finance management and the public sector. Relevant reforms include the continuation of coffee and cocoa sector reform; the adoption of a new mining code by the end of September 2013; in the area of public finance, the adoption of a draft law on the transparency code; in the electricity sector, the promotion of development and achievement of financial balance; in the hydrocarbon sector, the adoption, in November 2012, of an oil product price structure that will serve as a basis for implementing the automatic petroleum pump price-setting mechanism; and a strategy for developing the banking sector.

54. The Group will continue to assess the impact of such reforms on the country's economy, with a particular focus on natural resources whose revenues are at risk of being diverted for the purchase of arms and related materiel in violation of the arms embargo.

B. Contraband and illegal exploitation of natural resources

55. During the first part of the current mandate, the Group continued to investigate, update information about and follow up on investigations concerning contraband natural resources (in particular cocoa, cashew nuts, cotton, timber and gold) that are exported illegally from Côte d'Ivoire, generating revenues that have the potential to be used for the purchase of arms in breach of the sanctions regime, which otherwise would be exported legitimately and duly taxed by the Ivorian authorities. The Group also focused on the analysis of the petroleum sector and the possible diversion of funds from that sector.

56. The Group is in the process of assessing the legislative and administrative progress made by the Ivorian authorities in effectively addressing the problem of contraband.

57. In this context, the Group met with relevant Ivorian authorities on the exploitation and management of natural resources, as well as with agencies such as the Coffee and Cocoa Council and the Authority for the Regulation of Cotton and Cashew Nuts.

Cocoa

58. The Coffee and Cocoa Council informed the Group of Experts that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire had launched a series of measures to reform the cocoa sector in November 2011, in order to address some of the problems that had been affecting the industry since 2010, namely, the lack of security in production areas, racketeering and smuggling. Measures were implemented to obtain immediate results that would have a positive impact on the country's economy. Those of interest to the Group's mandate are:

(a) Guarantee to cocoa farmers of a minimum price of 725 CFA francs per kilogram on the production site, equivalent to 60 per cent of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) price (CFAF 1,208/kg);

(b) Deployment of around 368 of its own agents and 500 more from the national rural development agency (L'Agence nationale d'appui au développement rural) in order to control purchasers' compliance with the minimum price payment and final product quality within the 13 regional cocoa delegations of the Council;

(c) Introduction of an awareness campaign aimed at farmers in all 13 regional cocoa delegations;

(d) Creation of committees in each region, including farmers, buyers, transporters and all cocoa industry partners;

(e) Elaboration of instructions to the Council to undertake operational measures to apply sanctions leading to respect for the product's minimum price and obtaining the best international price.

59. According to the Government, some of the results so far of the above-mentioned measures are:

(a) Farmers obtained, conservatively, around CFAF 725 billion, equivalent to \$1.4 billion (or 60 per cent of the total value of the country's cocoa exports);

(b) The Council allocated funds for the construction of infrastructure, such as farm access tracks, schools, medical centres and village pumps, and for reinforcing the capacities of police, the gendarmerie and customs authorities;

(c) Contraband cocoa was reduced by 80 per cent.

60. The Group intends to further investigate and verify the developments and information obtained (especially on contraband) in the cocoa sector during the second part of its mandate and to assess whether the measures taken have effectively reduced the availability of illegal funds that may be used for the purchase of arms in violation of the sanctions regime.

Cashew nuts and cotton

61. The Group continued to investigate the difficulties faced by the cashew nut industry in Côte d'Ivoire, in particular the high level of contraband. The Group is concerned that funds obtained illegally through smuggling may continue to be used for the purchase of arms and related materiel in violation of the sanctions regime.

62. Even though the Government has made very clear, through administrative decisions, that cashew nuts can be exported only through the Ivorian seaports and airports, smuggling in the eastern part of the country to Ghana, especially in the areas near the city of Bondoukou, continues unabated and has not improved (see annex 12).

63. The Ivorian authorities highlighted that the main causes of the smuggling of cashew nuts and cotton are the weak power of Ivorian border control authorities (including customs, police and the gendarmerie); multiple non-official crossing points along the border with Ghana; higher transport and storage costs to deliver the product to the seaports; illegal checkpoints; and the existence of a well-organized military infrastructure that escorts and facilitates the contraband.

64. In this regard, the Authority for the Regulation of Cotton and Cashew Nuts informed the Group that the Government was in the process of undertaking a comprehensive reform of the cashew nut and cotton industries.

65. Through this reform, the Government provides the framework for the creation of an entity responsible for the regulation, supervision and development of the cashew nut and cotton industries. This entity will be a non-profit organization that centralizes all the decision-making centres on marketing operations and regulatory activities related to cashew nuts and cotton.

66. The reform's main objective is to enable stakeholders, including producers, to profit from selling their products on the market. Other specific objectives are improving productivity and product quality, establishing a marketing system that will allow producers a guaranteed minimum price equivalent to at least 60 per cent of the CIF price and reducing unemployment through the integration of youth and ex-combatants in activities related to the production and processing of cotton and cashew nuts.

67. The Group will continue to assess the development of the foreseen reform of the industry and its impact overall on the smuggling of cashew nuts and cotton.

Other natural resources

68. The Group of Experts continued its investigations concerning traditional natural resources the revenues, or diverted revenues, of which may be used to purchase arms in violation of the sanctions regime, namely timber, gold and petroleum. Consistent with past practice, the Group addressed numerous letters to the concerned Ivorian authorities in order to obtain updated information concerning each of those goods.

69. The Group continues to investigate the production and illegal exploitation of artisanal gold mining in Côte d'Ivoire in order to establish whether the revenues obtained therefrom may have been used for the purchase of arms and related materiel in violation of the sanctions regime. In a meeting with the Minister of Industry and Mines¹ on 2 September 2013, the Group confirmed that illegal artisanal mining continued to be a serious problem for the authorities, mainly in terms of security and the loss of tax revenues.

70. The Minister of Industry and Mines indicated that in order to address the situation, the Ivorian authorities were implementing a mining code with a section dedicated to the regulation of artisanal mining. The Minister explained that the authorities looked forward to calling upon ECOWAS to address the problem in a regional context owing to the fact that some neighbouring countries faced similar problems concerning artisanal mining.

71. During its meeting with the Minister of Industry and Mines, the Group drew his attention to paragraph 25 of resolution 2101 (2013), by which the Security Council encouraged the Ivorian authorities to participate in the implementation programme hosted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with regard to the due diligence guidelines for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas and to reach out to international

¹ On 25 July 2013, mining was moved from the Ministry of Mines, Petroleum and Energy and integrated into the Ministry of Industry.

organizations with a view to taking advantage of lessons learned from other initiatives and countries that have and are confronting similar issues on artisanal mining.

72. In this context, the Group intends to attend the sixth meeting of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region/OECD/United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo forum on implementing due diligence for responsible mineral supply chains, to be held in Kigali from 13 to 15 November, where the implementation of the OECD due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas will be reviewed and discussed.

C. Illegal taxation system

73. The Group sought to evaluate the compliance of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire with paragraph 26 of resolution 2101 (2013), by which the Council called upon the Ivorian authorities to take the measures necessary to dismantle the illegal taxation networks, including by undertaking relevant and thorough investigations, reduce the number of checkpoints and prevent incidents of racketeering throughout the country, and called upon the authorities to take the steps necessary to continue to re-establish and reinforce relevant institutions and to accelerate the deployment of customs and border control officials in the northern, western and eastern parts of the country.

74. The Group continues to investigate, follow up on and update information concerning the findings of previous Groups of Experts on the extension of the illegal taxation system in Côte d'Ivoire as well as the existence of a number of checkpoints and various incidents of racketeering.

75. In a meeting with the Minister of Defence on 26 August, the Group was informed that the Ivorian authorities (police, gendarmerie and FRCI) had managed to dismantle 150 illegal checkpoints throughout the country in an attempt to maintain only 33 official control posts. In this context, the Group witnessed a considerable decrease in the number of illegal checkpoints in Abidjan.

76. In a meeting with the Minister of the Interior on 27 August, the Group learned that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, with the support of the World Bank, had created a unit to combat racketeering. The Group intends to present the results achieved by the unit in its final report.

D. Piracy

77. With reference to its previous report regarding incidents of piracy near or within Ivorian territorial waters (S/2013/228, paras. 160-163), the Group is aware of the purchase of a number of military boats by the Ivorian authorities, as stated in paragraph 36 above.

78. The Group has been informed that one of the objectives of the purchase was to enhance the capacity of the Ivorian maritime authorities to secure territorial waters and deter possible acts of piracy.

79. The Group is of the view that such acts of piracy (involving robbery or criminal violence at sea) represent breaches of the embargo and will continue to investigate this issue further.

VIII. Customs and transport

80. Pursuant to paragraphs 18 and 27 of resolution 2101 (2013), the Group monitored the delivery to Côte d'Ivoire of non-lethal and lethal military equipment under the sanctions regime, in conformity with relevant resolutions and with a view to assessing the risk of sanctions violations through an analysis of the customs and related operations at Ivorian international ports, the airport and all official points of entry to Côte d'Ivoire from neighbouring States.

81. In addition, the Group considers that it is important to identify areas in which the capacities of the customs administrations of the States in the region can be strengthened to enhance the implementation of the arms embargo and other measures imposed by the Security Council.

A. Monitoring the delivery to Côte d'Ivoire of non-lethal and lethal military equipment

82. By paragraph 5 of resolution 2101 (2013), the Security Council urged the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to give the Group of Experts and UNOCI access to the exempted materiel at the time of import and before its transfer to the end-user. Pursuant to this requirement, during the first part of its mandate the Group investigated the current status of the delivery to Côte d'Ivoire of non-lethal and lethal military equipment, in collaboration with the UNOCI Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit and the Ivorian customs authorities, in order to assess Ivorian compliance with the sanctions regime (notification and the exemption procedures).

83. On the basis of the information gathered from both the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit and the Ivorian customs authorities regarding the implementation of the measures related to the import of non-lethal and lethal military equipment, the Group considers that improvements have been made by the Ivorian authorities in complying with the above-mentioned procedures.

84. The Group will continue to monitor similar cases during the remainder of the mandate and will provide, in its final report, a comprehensive assessment of the Government's compliance with the arms embargo and other measures imposed by the Security Council.

B. Risk of violations of the sanctions regime through the customs and related operations at official points of entry to Côte d'Ivoire from neighbouring States

85. By paragraph 26 of resolution 2101 (2013), the Security Council called upon the Ivorian authorities, among other actions, to reduce the number of checkpoints, to prevent incidents of racketeering throughout the country and to accelerate the deployment of customs and border control officials in the northern, western and

eastern parts of the country. In addition, in paragraph 27 of the resolution, the Group of Experts was mandated to assess the effectiveness of those border measures and controls in the region.

86. In the framework of its mandate, the Group identified 94 customs offices in the country (see annex 13), 25 of which are official points of entry to Côte d'Ivoire from neighbouring countries (see annex 14), and started its investigation with the visit, in the south-east, of the regional customs office of Aboisso and the border post office of Noé, the main official point of entry to Côte d'Ivoire from Ghana.

87. The Group noted the decrease in the number of customs personnel and that the staff currently covered around 58 per cent of the region instead of 70 per cent, as reported in the previous report (S/2013/228). Vehicles, boats and other materiel or equipment required by the mobile customs brigades for the surveillance and patrolling of the coast and lagoons were lacking; in the area of the village of Saikro, a variety of goods (mostly hardware, kitchenware and electronics) had been smuggled to and from Ghana; and the contraband was transported across the lagoon by boat, in disregard of the few ill-equipped customs officers who were present.

88. When approached to discuss the Group's observations, regional customs officers informed the Group that, in fact, the staff had decreased owing to an internal reassignment of personnel, and the lack of equipment continued to be a major issue in surveying the lagoons and the coast.

89. Considering the above-mentioned findings, the Group aims to systematically visit the rest of the customs border offices in order to properly evaluate the risk of violations of the sanctions regime.

90. On the roadway from Abidjan to Noé, covering almost 190 km, the Group identified 10 illegal checkpoints² secured by FRCI, the gendarmerie, the police and water and forestry officials, without any presence of the Ivorian customs service. The Group verified that customs officers performed their duties only at official border post offices. Goods are sealed and properly identified in order to prevent illegal taxing practices on the way to their destination points. This practice is in line with Ivorian and international standards.

C. Risk of violations of the sanctions regime through customs and related operations at Ivorian international ports and Abidjan international airport

91. On 23 August, the Group inspected the roadway from Abidjan to San Pedro and visited the regional customs office, the airport and different areas inside the port of San Pedro. During its discussions with customs officials, the Group noted that the verification of imported containers of goods had always been carried out manually in the customs premises of the port or at the importers' or brokers' locations. The container-scanning service for customs verification purposes has never existed at the port of San Pedro, the second largest port after Abidjan. In addition, the Group is aware that the monitoring of the 160-km maritime and coastal borders is weak or non-existent owing to the lack of personnel and equipment.

² The Government announced only 33 checkpoints in the country, only 1 at the entrance of each main city.

92. In connection with the above-mentioned findings, considered as factors contributing to the risk of violations of the sanctions regime, the Deputy Director General of Customs confirmed that there was ongoing training of 2,000 demobilized ex-combatants from the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme who would be integrated into the customs administration at the end of their training to progressively reduce the staffing deficiency.

93. Concerning the container-scanning service, it exists only at the port of Abidjan and is provided by a private contractor, Bivac Scan CI, a company affiliated with Bureau Veritas. During its investigation, the Group learned that the contract of the company had been suspended for a period of almost two months from June to August 2013 and subsequently resumed.

94. Considering the importance of the container-scanning service in relation to the prevention of possible embargo violations at the port, the Group began to investigate the transit of cargo during the suspension of the service and expects to finalize its investigations during the current mandate.

95. The Group observed 25 illegal checkpoints on the roadway from Abidjan to San Pedro secured by the same individuals described in paragraph 90 above.

D. Monitoring of the arms embargo by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

96. In accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1609 (2005), as referred to in paragraph 7 (a) of resolution 1727 (2006) and in conformity with paragraph 18 of resolution 2101 (2013), the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit, in the context of monitoring the arms embargo, inspects aircraft cargo and any cargo vehicle transiting through the ports, airports, airfields, military bases and borders of Côte d'Ivoire, as necessary.

97. During its visit to the port and airport of San Pedro, the Group observed that the Unit was not deployed in the area and was therefore unable to properly conduct the above-mentioned tasks, despite the repeated concern expressed regarding the lack of customs expertise in the Unit as documented in the Group's previous reports (see S/2008/598, para. 189; S/2009/521, para. 25; S/2010/179, para. 156; S/2012/766, para. 85; and S/2013/228, para. 221).

98. In this context, and taking into account the importance of cargo inspections and risk assessment for the effectiveness of the implementation of the embargo sanctions regime, the Group will continue to review the administration of customs at the port of Abidjan, Abidjan international airport and other relevant border entry points.

E. Strengthening the regional customs administrations to enhance the implementation of the arms embargo and other measures as imposed by the Security Council

99. In connection with paragraph 27 of resolution 2101 (2013), in which the Security Council asked the Group of Experts to assess the effectiveness of border measures and control in the region and encouraged all neighbouring States to be

aware of Ivorian efforts in that regard, the Group believes that while a range of governmental authorities may be tasked with monitoring and providing information on compliance with the sanctions regime, the Ivorian customs authorities are crucial for the implementation and monitoring of regional and international laws and regulations regarding measures under the regime.

100. With a view to strengthening the implementation of the arms embargo and other measures imposed by the Security Council on Côte d'Ivoire, States, particularly those in the subregion, should strengthen cooperatively their customs administrations.

101. In the light of the foregoing, the Group aims during the remainder of the mandate to contribute to the identification of areas in which the capacities of States in the region can be strengthened to enhance the implementation of the embargo sanctions regime and other measures in the areas of customs and transport.

IX. Diamonds

102. The Group of Experts maintains the view, as expressed in its 2012 midterm report (S/2012/766, para. 94), that the measures and restrictions imposed by the Council in its resolution 1643 (2005) and reiterated in resolution 2101 (2013) do not prevent the illicit production and trafficking of Ivorian rough diamonds.

103. The Group also maintains the view that in both Séguéla and Tortiya, the two main diamond-mining areas located in the north of the country, revenues from the sale of Ivorian rough diamonds continue to have the potential to be used for the purchase of arms and related materiel.

104. Artisanal diamond production in the mining areas of Séguéla and Tortiya is ongoing, although at a reduced pace that is fully compatible with the adverse condition of mining areas during the rainy season. Considering that Ivorian rough diamond production continues and that the production is not locally stored, rough diamonds are believed to be continuously smuggled out of the country.

105. Furthermore, the fact that rough diamond smuggling has continued unhindered since the entry into force of the diamond embargo in 2005 suggests the activity of well-established and organized networks rather than of individuals. The Group has gathered evidence of the existence of a network of both local and foreign price-fixers (*coursiers*), middlemen and small buyers operating at the mining sites (Tortiya, Bobi, Diarabana) and the regional level (Séguéla and Korhogo). These first-step operators in turn sell rough diamonds to buyers who smuggle them outside of Côte d'Ivoire, through neighbouring countries (mainly Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Liberia, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone).

106. The Group has obtained information indicating that a portion of the Ivorian diamond production is sent to international trading, cutting and polishing centres directly through Abidjan and its international airport (ABJ) and is conducting an investigation to determine how and to what extent.

107. Information gathered on diamond sales in the Séguéla mining area allowed for the identification of a number of main traders who are active, both locally and from ECOWAS countries, at the mining site level. During the remainder of the mandate, the Group intends to fully investigate those buyers to gather information on the trading

chains responsible for the export of rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire and the route used.

108. The Group is investigating companies and individuals that have approached the Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d'Ivoire (SODEMI), the State-run company in charge of developing diamond mining in the country, expressing the intention to buy rough diamonds issued under its permits. The Group understands that SODEMI informed the individuals and companies that the sanctions regime in Côte d'Ivoire prohibited the import of Ivorian rough diamonds.

109. Information gathered by the Group during previous mandates, most notably a large quantity of e-mail exchanges among individuals connected to the administration of former President Laurent Gbagbo between 2010 and 2012, suggests the existence of a network centred in South Africa involved in the trade of diamonds between Africa and Asia. The Group intends to continue its investigation in this framework in order to provide a comprehensive analysis in its final report in April 2014.

110. Côte d'Ivoire is making an effort, through legislation and regulation, to put in place a system of controls and statistics on the diamond-trading chain that is designed to meet the minimum standards required by the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The Group considers this to be a positive development, as it will provide for reliable statistics on the production and sale of rough diamonds, at least for those operators who will abide by the legal framework. The Group intends to follow closely those efforts.

111. The Group notes with concern that both Ivorian authorities and some of the country's technical and financial partners are convinced that achieving compliance with the Kimberley Process will automatically result in the lifting of the diamond embargo imposed by the Security Council. On the basis of that assumption, Côte d'Ivoire is focusing only on implementing a system of controls and statistics that will eventually be technically compliant with the Kimberley Process, but is consistently failing to address the issue of diamond smuggling in violation of the sanctions regime.

112. The Group of Experts would like to point out that, since the imposition of the diamond embargo in 2005, the Ivorian authorities have not identified a single case of diamond smuggling, even after the redeployment of State administration in the zones previously under the control of the Forces nouvelles. The Group considers that the effective restoration of State control and the rule of law in the mining areas, together with serious reform of the system of controls at the police and customs level, is necessary in order to avoid the risk of further violations of the sanctions regime.

113. The Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire, the Ministers of Defence, Interior and Industry and Mines and the national Kimberley Process secretariat continue to express the view that the diamond embargo is blocking a significant source of revenue for the State, hindering the country's efforts in security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The aforementioned authorities also claim that the diamond embargo is negatively affecting the livelihoods of the population in the mining areas, which has traditionally earned its living through artisanal diamond mining.

114. Considering that diamond production has remained at the levels highlighted in the Group's previous reports, the annual value of Ivorian diamond production is estimated to fluctuate between \$12 million and \$23 million, representing 0.048-0.093 per cent of the country's GDP (totalling \$24.7 billion in 2012). The overall contribution of the entire mining sector to the fiscal revenues of Côte d'Ivoire, according to the 2013 validation report of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), is 7 per cent.

115. These figures suggest that the economic role of the diamond sector has not had, to date, any significant impact on national revenues. Likewise, the socioeconomic impact of the diamond embargo on the livelihood of the local population can be considered to be marginal, as diamonds continue to be extracted and sold regularly. However, funds generated by the diamond sector could indeed allow for the purchase of a significant quantity of arms and related materiel, a possibility that the Ivorian authorities themselves have not excluded.

A. Diamond production in Côte d'Ivoire and the role of the Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d'Ivoire

116. In a decree of 30 May, the country authorized diamond production in the areas corresponding to the permits withheld by SODEMI. Workers (*ouvriers*), supervisors (*exploitants*) and diamond buyers (*acheteurs*) must be registered under the supervision of SODEMI and receive a nominal identification card to be authorized to work. Concerning diamond-buying activity, the decree states that the sale of diamonds will be performed only through agreed structures and registered in diaries bearing the label "for administrative use only". Likewise, the cards issued to the purchasers (*collecteurs*) indicate that the card does not constitute an authorization for the buying and selling of diamonds. The buyers receive a block of receipts bearing the same "for administrative purposes only" label and have to deliver receipts justifying every transaction. As at 2 August, a total of 797 workers, 65 supervisors and 155 buyers had been registered and issued identification cards.

117. In the view of the Group, the decree rules out the prospect that SODEMI will be responsible for the implementation of Kimberley Process procedures and the system of controls. The document makes SODEMI responsible for the organization and oversight of artisanal diamond exploitation activities and directs it to define parcels for artisanal exploitation inside its premises. The areas that SODEMI has designated for artisanal exploitation are listed in table 1.

Table 1
Global positioning system coordinates of the sub-parcels designated for artisanal diamond mining by the Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d'Ivoire in its permits

Parcel designation	Coordinates		Distance between parcels (metres)
	North	West	
Bobi subsector			
A	08°09'26"	06°32'44"	
B	08°09'22"	06°32'44"	
C	08°09'21"	06°32'47"	
D	08°09'15"	06°32'47"	
E	08°09'09"	06°32'48"	D to E = 117
F	08°09'06"	06°32'49"	E to F = 100
G	08°09'04"	06°32'51"	F to G = 50
H	08°09'03"	06°32'53"	G to H = 69
I	08°09'00"	06°32'55"	H to I = 116
J	08°09'57"	06°32'48"	I to J = 250
K	08°09'05"	06°32'46"	J to K = 250
L	08°09'08"	06°32'44"	K to L = 100
M	08°09'20"	06°32'38"	
N	08°09'20"	06°32'39"	M to N = 50
O	08°09'23"	06°32'40"	N to O = 100
P	08°09'24"	06°32'43"	O to P = 137
Diarabana subsector			
A	08°12'45"	06°35'34"	A is opposite the backwater
B	08°12'36"	06°35'25"	A to B = 400
C	08°12'43"	06°35'38"	B to C = 465
D	08°12'48"	06°35'36"	A is opposite the backwater

118. Three decrees issued on 6 June attribute three diamond research permits to SODEMI in the areas of Nandala, Diarabana and Bobi. The Group has asked SODEMI and the Ivorian Kimberley Process secretariat to specify what measures SODEMI intends to put in place to ensure that diamonds originating from the exploration of the aforementioned areas, which are already known diamond exploitation sites, are prevented from being exported in violation of the sanctions regime. Both SODEMI and the national Kimberley Process secretariat replied that the Ivorian authorities were currently focused on putting in place the Kimberley Process system of controls at the mining sites and thus were not looking at where the diamonds would eventually be sold.

119. As pointed out in paragraph 104 above, the Group is aware that diamonds extracted in SODEMI concessions are continuing to be sold internally and eventually smuggled outside of Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the sanctions regime, as no measure is currently in place to stockpile diamond production inside the country.

The Group notes with concern that an article, common to all three decrees mentioned in paragraph 118 authorizes SODEMI to request a full exploitation permit for the aforementioned areas at any time during the period of validity of the permit, which is likely to cause a rise in diamond production in the area, without placing any condition on SODEMI to exercise due diligence to ensure that the diamonds are not smuggled outside Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the sanctions regime.

120. In June, SODEMI carried out technical visits to its premises to evaluate the status of its former offices and personnel compound in Bobi and to assess the mining situation directly. SODEMI reported that there was no proper organization and that many diamond miners were non-Ivorians, operating without the control of villages and traditional authorities and selling their products (directly or through middlemen) in their respective countries of origin.

121. In its capacity as overseer of Kimberley Process procedures in its concessions, SODEMI has planned to resume the trading system of the groupements à vocation coopérative (GVCs) (described in detail in S/2008/598 and S/2011/271) by transforming them into cooperatives with a statute recognized under the Organisation pour l'harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires (OHADA) regulations. To date, 5 of the 20 existing GVCs have signed their statute and SODEMI has announced that it is in the process of signing an agreement with them, allowing them to perform diamond-trading activities inside SODEMI concessions.

122. The Group performed one overflight of the areas attributed to SODEMI and one overflight of the Tortiya diamond-mining areas, on 21 and 22 August, respectively, and observed a reduced number of workers at the mining and washing sites, which is due to the flooding of mining pits that occurs regularly during the rainy season. The Group observed the usual composition of working squads of four or five diggers/washers monitored by a supervisor.

B. Ministry of Industry and Mines

123. By means of a presidential decree of 25 July, Jean Claude Brou was appointed Minister of Industry and Mines, thus receiving the mining portfolio from the former Ministry of Mines, Oil and Energy, led by Adama Toungara, with the new title of Minister of Oil and Energy. On that occasion, the spokesman of the Government, Bruno Koné, announced to the media that this choice was meant to rationalize the industrial development of the Ivorian mining sector.

124. The Group of Experts met with Mr. Brou on 2 September and has benefited from the cooperation of the Ministry and its subsidiary organs. The Minister of Industry and Mines, the national Kimberley Process secretariat and SODEMI have met the Group's requests for information and meetings and have provided it with access to the documents required, including hard copies and soft copies of legal documents, global positioning system coordinates and maps of diamond-mining parcels.

125. The Group queried the Ministry of Industry and Mines regarding the proposals made by Côte d'Ivoire in 2008 to the World Bank and other donors to put in place a system to stock and hold rough diamonds inside the country until the lifting of the embargo, which the Group cited in its 2009 final report (S/2009/521, paras. 277 and

278). The Ministry informed the Group that the plan, elaborated in 2008, which provided for a major diamond-trading company to take charge of the buying and stockpiling of diamonds, had been abandoned. The diamond company had indeed requested a monopoly for the purchase of current and future Ivorian rough diamonds, including those purchased following the lifting of the embargo, which the Ministry considered unviable. The Government of Côte d'Ivoire has thus temporarily set aside the idea owing to financial and technical constraints (such as the need to advance the money required to buy diamonds and to ensure the physical security of diamonds).

126. The Minister informed the Group that Côte d'Ivoire was still open to receiving assistance in the area of diamonds from the World Bank or other international donors, citing as an example the assistance received from Liberia on the same matter or from private companies, provided that no monopoly on the purchase of Ivorian rough diamonds were set as a precondition. The Minister added that SODEMI would not be consulted on the eventual choice of a public or private partner because it was only a technical operator, and such a decision needed to be taken at the political level. The Group still considers that Côte d'Ivoire should offer, as a priority, firm and verifiable guarantees that its diamond production cannot and will not be exported outside the country in violation of the sanctions regime before putting in place systems that allow internal buying and selling of rough diamonds.

C. Countries of interest in the region

127. Of the five States bordering Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Liberia are full participants in the Kimberley Process, with an established national secretariat that reports production and trade statistics to the Kimberley Process. Mali, whose known diamond production is limited, became a Kimberley Process participant in July but it has yet to submit any data on its national diamond-trading chain. Burkina Faso is the only country bordering Côte d'Ivoire that is not a member of the Kimberley Process.

128. Sierra Leone, which is a member of the Mano River Union, together with Guinea, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, is also a Kimberley Process participant reporting to the Kimberley Process through its own national secretariat. Nevertheless, although Ghana has made commendable efforts to modernize its diamond statistics and control systems and has promptly replied to requests for information from the Group, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone have all come under scrutiny by the Kimberley Process for their substandard statistics and control systems, which leaves them easily vulnerable to cross-border diamond smuggling.

129. The Group has asked the Minister of Industry and Mines whether Côte d'Ivoire has envisaged the possibility of reinforcing regional cooperation on diamond production and trade with its neighbouring countries and in the framework of the Mano River Union. The Minister replied that such reinforced cooperation had been discussed with Burkina Faso as regards gold trafficking, but no such discussion had been put forward for diamonds.

Burkina Faso

130. In previous reports (e.g., S/2011/271) the Group has pointed to the existence of networks to smuggle diamonds and other natural resources of Ivorian origin to

Burkina Faso. The Group intends to continue investigating this matter and will provide conclusions in its final report in April 2014.

Ghana

131. The Group is investigating a network of international diamond and gold dealers close to the administration of former President Gbagbo, who until 2012 had been operating from Ghana.

132. In response to the Group's request for information concerning documents that have been presented to some traders as authentic Kimberley Process certificates issued by Ghana, Ghanaian authorities confirmed that they were fully seized of the matter. The Group intends to continue its investigation in this framework in order to provide a comprehensive assessment and analysis in its final report.

Guinea


133. Guinea is a Kimberley Process participant with an established secretariat in charge of keeping records on national diamond production. The Studies Department of the Ministry of Mines and Geology also compiles statistics on Guinean diamond production.

134. The National Bureau of Expertise (BNE) is the government body responsible for clearing diamond parcels for export, but its control is limited to assessing the value of diamond parcels for fiscal (export tax) purposes and does not include the exercise of due diligence regarding registered diamond exporters and their suppliers.

135. The Anti-Fraud Brigade is in charge of enforcing diamond controls at Conakry international airport (known as Gbessia, or CKY) and is sometimes invited by the National Bureau of Expertise to assist its diamond evaluation operations on an ad hoc basis.

136. Guinean stakeholders at the Ministry of Geology and Mines, the Kimberley Process secretariat, the Anti-Fraud Brigade and BNE revealed that Guinean authorities, especially the Anti-Fraud Brigade, were not properly equipped to effectively control the flows of diamonds in and around the Guinean diamond-producing region (Macenta, Banankoro and Fénaria). Smuggling of Ivorian rough diamonds into Guinean production is thus deemed possible by the same authorities. In particular, the Anti-Fraud Brigade is currently deployed only at Conakry international airport and in Conakry, but lacks operational capacity in the diamond-producing areas.

Figure I
Known diamond deposits in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone



Source: Bureau of Geological and Mining Research, France.

Note: Diamond deposits are indicated by stars.

137. The Studies Department of the Ministry of Mines and Geology does not have or produce reliable statistics on national diamond production. For example, for the second half of 2012 only, Ministry statistics reported a national production of just 15,000 carats, while exports registered by the Kimberley Process totalled some 200,000 carats (which is in line with the U.S. Geological Survey estimate of Guinean rough diamond capacity of about 350,000 carats a year). The absence of reliable statistics leaves Guinea particularly vulnerable to the introduction of rough diamonds from neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire that can be mixed with local production and reach international markets with perfectly valid Kimberley Process certificates released by Guinea.

138. Lebanese diamond dealers contacted by the Group in Conakry confirmed the existence of ethnic Guineans in Côte d'Ivoire who smuggle Ivorian diamonds into Guinea's diamond-producing areas and to Conakry. The Group was able to confirm with Guinean, Lebanese and Israeli diamond traders in Conakry that cross-border trafficking of rough diamonds between Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea is a common practice among diamond dealers of Guinean origin and descent operating in Tortiya and Séguéla, as pointed out in the Group's 2011 midterm report (S/2011/271). The Group intends to continue its investigations in this framework in order to provide a comprehensive assessment and analysis in its final report, due in April 2014.

Liberia

139. The Kimberley Process conducted a review mission in Liberia from 18 to 25 March, pointing out many of the deficiencies of the Kimberley Process system of controls in Liberia. The findings of the mission are included in the 2013 midterm report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia (S/2013/316, paras. 48-52).

140. As reported in paragraph 53 of that report, "some Ivorian production from western Côte d'Ivoire is being shipped illegally into Nimba County, where it is entering the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in order to be certificated prior to export to international markets". The Group is investigating this matter in collaboration with the Panel of Experts on Liberia and will provide conclusions in its final report.


Mali

141. The Group is investigating a number of Malian nationals operating in the Séguéla and Tortiya diamond fields who may be exporting rough diamonds to Mali in violation of the sanctions regime. The Group is also collaborating with the Kimberley Process Working Group of Diamond Experts regarding the procedures to request the importation for scientific purposes of the diamonds seized by Malian customs and held at the airport in Bamako, which were referred to in the Group's final report in 2008 (S/2008/598, paras. 141-151).

Sierra Leone

142. Following up on the findings of its April 2013 report (S/2013/228), the Group is investigating a parcel of diamonds reportedly traded by a network of individuals close to the administration of former President Gbagbo that bears a Kimberley Process certificate of origin, allegedly issued by Sierra Leone, but which has been confirmed as counterfeit by the Sierra Leonean authorities. The Group intends to continue its investigations in this framework in order to provide a comprehensive assessment and analysis in its final report.

Figure II
Forged Kimberley Process certificate



D. International initiatives relevant to the Ivorian diamond sector

Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

143. In paragraph 6 of its resolution 2101 (2013), the Security Council affirms that it was ready to review the measures preventing the importation by any State of all rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire in the light of progress made towards Kimberley Process implementation.

144. An Ivorian decree of 30 May authorizes the national Kimberley Process secretariat and the General Directorate of Geology and Mines to move towards the implementation of the Kimberley Process system of controls on diamond production.

145. On 26 June, the Kimberley Process secretariat issued guidelines on the procedures for the implementation of the Kimberley Process in Côte d'Ivoire that describe the measures to be put in place and the authorities responsible for moving towards Ivorian compliance with the Kimberley Process.

146. The national bureau of expertise on precious minerals (Service d'expertise et d'évaluation des pierres et métaux précieux) has developed a set of databases to register diamond workers and traders in Côte d'Ivoire and to keep records of the diamond production and of receipts issued upon the completion of diamond transactions. The databases are currently stored on a local computer at the premises of the bureau, but will be backed up on an external server as requested by the national guidelines on Kimberley Process implementation. The bureau also informed the Group that the databases could be shared in real time with authorized users, such as the national Kimberley Process secretariat, but that this would involve some technical adjustments requiring external expertise. The Group has received copies of all the databases updated as at 2 September 2013.

147. On 26 August, the General Directorate of Customs issued an administrative order related to the procedures for the import, export and temporary admission of rough diamonds that refers to the above-mentioned Kimberley Process guidelines of 26 June issued by the national Kimberley Process secretariat. The administrative order states that the export of rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire is allowed only through Abidjan international airport and that such exports are under the authority of the customs office at the airport.

148. The Group remains concerned that no mention is made in the administrative order that rough diamonds are subject to a Security Council-imposed embargo, and thus are non-exportable. This reinforces the concerns expressed in paragraph 111 above about Côte d'Ivoire not taking adequately into account the existence of the diamond embargo and instead focusing only on rejoining the Kimberley Process. During a meeting with the Group, the Minister of Finance, to whom the General Directorate of Customs eventually reports, agreed to facilitate future exchanges of information with the airport customs office.

149. The Group takes note of the proactive nature of the Ivorian authorities at all levels in moving forward to establish a system of controls and statistics to be technically compliant with Kimberley Process requirements. The Group also notes that a review visit to Côte d'Ivoire from the Kimberley Process, which will include members of the Working Group of Diamond Experts as well as representatives of the Chair of the Kimberley Process, is expected from 30 September to 4 October to evaluate the prospect of recommending the readmission of Côte d'Ivoire to the Kimberley Process at its plenary meeting in South Africa, to be held from 19 to 22 November.

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

150. Côte d'Ivoire was declared compliant with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in May 2013, after its 2011 EITI report was certified

by an independent validator (the French firm CAC 75). The EITI report focuses mainly on the oil and gas sector, which accounted for 93 per cent of the extractive sector's contribution to the fiscal revenues of Côte d'Ivoire, and does not take into account artisanal mining. The Group recommends that future EITI reports for Côte d'Ivoire reflect the contribution of the artisanal mining sector to the national treasury, which will enhance transparency in the origin and destination of revenues originating from the sector.

E. Diamond revenues

151. As cited in previous reports of the Group of Experts, in the past the Forces nouvelles in Séguéla and Tortiya obtained revenues from the control, directly through involvement in production or indirectly through its parallel taxation system centred on "La Centrale" (the central treasury of Forces nouvelles), over the production and sale of diamonds. These revenues are known to have contributed to the strengthening of the regional administrative and military structures of the Forces nouvelles. The Group has observed that this system has not changed with the redeployment of State administration in Séguéla and Tortiya, and it intends to produce evidence of individuals who continue to illicitly extract profits from diamond exploitation.

152. Furthermore, the Group received information that individuals holding command positions in the Forces nouvelles used to pre-finance the activities of artisanal diamond miners in return for the production to be sold to the commanders at fixed prices. This system allowed the aforementioned individuals to gain high profits from diamond production that were used to strengthen their personal positions and to secure valuable economic assets in Côte d'Ivoire and abroad. The Group of Experts intends to follow up this information and report its findings in its final report.

F. Diamond footprinting/fingerprinting

153. By paragraph 23 of resolution 2101 (2013), the Security Council renewed the exemptions set out in paragraphs 16 and 17 of resolution 1893 (2009)³ with regard to the securing of samples of rough diamonds for scientific research purposes coordinated by the Kimberley Process.

154. The Group was informed by the Chair of the Working Group of Diamond Experts in Antwerp, Belgium, that the Kimberley Process, South Africa and Brazil were willing to start the procedures to request the sanctions committee to authorize

³ By which the Council decided that the measures imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 1643 (2005) should not apply to an import that will be used solely for the purposes of scientific research and analysis to facilitate the development of specific technical information concerning Ivorian diamond production, provided the research is coordinated by the Kimberley Process and approved on a case-by-case basis by the Committee and decided that a request made in accordance with paragraph 16 of the resolution should be submitted to the Committee jointly by the Kimberley Process and the importing Member State, and that where the Committee had approved an exemption pursuant to that paragraph, the importing Member State should notify the Committee of the results of the study and share the results, without delay, with the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire to assist them in their investigations.

the importation for scientific analysis of the parcel of diamonds confiscated by Malian authorities at the Bamako airport. The Group intends to continue its investigations in this framework in order to provide a comprehensive assessment and analysis in its final report.

X. Individual sanctions

155. The Group continued to investigate possible violations of the individual sanctions (travel ban and assets freeze) in accordance with the measures imposed in paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), as renewed in paragraph 1 and amended in paragraph 4 of resolution 1643 (2005). These individuals are Charles Blé Goudé, Martin Kouakou Fofié, and Eugène N'gorang Djué Kouadio. Additionally, with the adoption of Council resolution 1975 (2011), targeted sanctions were imposed on Laurent Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo, Alcide Djédjé, Pascal Affi N'Guessan and Désiré Tagro.

156. The Group has formally addressed a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Côte d'Ivoire with a view to receiving updated official information concerning the judicial status of those sanctioned individuals and to indicate that they continue to be subject to targeted sanctions.

157. The Group also addressed a letter dated 4 September 2013 to the Abidjan office of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) in response to the bank's letter dated 6 April 2013 containing bank account numbers of individuals under United Nations targeted sanctions. The Group's letter also seeks to request information from three banks that did not comply with the request of BCEAO for information.

158. BCEAO attached to its letter a table containing a list of 10 banks at which individuals under targeted sanctions had bank accounts. The table describes some of the accounts as having been closed. However, the Group addressed separate letters to Ivorian banks for which it was not clearly indicated whether the accounts had been closed or frozen.

Charles Blé Goudé

159. The Ministry of Justice informed the Group that Mr. Blé Goudé remained in detention awaiting trial. The Group is in the process of contacting the Banque pour le financement de l'agriculture (BFA) in order to obtain details about an account in the name of Mr. Blé Goudé with a balance of CFAF 9,023,100 on 26 December 2012.

Martin Kouakou Fofié

160. The Group addressed a letter dated 4 September 2013 to the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations in order to verify reports that Mr. Fofié may have entered the country under a false passport and that he may be hospitalized.

161. The Group is in the process of contacting the Banque atlantique Côte d'Ivoire to obtain details about accounts in the name of Mr. Fofié as follows: three checking accounts with a balance of CFAF 19,427,045; two savings accounts with a balance of CFAF 223,089; and one ordinary account with a zero balance.

Eugène N'gorang Kouadio Djué

162. The Group continues to investigate possible breaches of the targeted sanctions regime by Eugène N'gorang Kouadio Djué.

Laurent Gbagbo

163. The Group has addressed a letter to BFA to obtain details about two bank accounts in the name of Mr. Gbagbo.

164. The Group is also in the process of contacting the London Branch of the bank Crédit lyonnais to obtain details about an account supposedly belonging to Mr. Gbagbo.

Simone Gbagbo

165. The Group continues to investigate possible breaches of the targeted sanctions regime imposed on Ms. Gbagbo.

Alcide Djédjé

166. In a meeting on 27 August, the Group was informed by the Ministry of Justice that Mr. Djédjé had been temporarily released from prison but remained in Côte d'Ivoire awaiting trial. The Group informed the Ministry that Mr. Djédjé continued to be under United Nations targeted sanctions. The Group is also awaiting an official reply concerning the current legal status, according to the Ivorian authorities, of Mr. Djédjé.

Pascal Affi N'Guessan

167. In a meeting on 27 August, the Group was informed by the Ministry of Justice that Mr. Affi N'Guessan had been temporarily released from a prison but remained in Côte d'Ivoire awaiting trial. The Group informed the Ministry that he continued to be under United Nations targeted sanctions. The Group is also awaiting an official reply concerning the current legal status, according to the Ivorian authorities, of Mr. Affi N'Guessan.

XI. Recommendations

168. The recommendations of the Group are set out below.

Arms

169. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire strictly follow the notification and exemption procedures as outlined by the Security Council in its resolution 2101 (2013), in particular by providing customs and related transportation data and details on the end-users (see para. 4 of the resolution).

170. The Group recommends that the Ministries of Defence and Interior provide a detailed organization chart showing their respective structures, including the official decrees related to any unit responsible for special assignments, counter-terrorism and/or protection of authorities and institutions; the composition and size of the unit; and weapons possessed or stockpiled by such units (i.e. vehicles, communication devices, optoelectronic and individual special combat equipment).

171. The Group recommends that the Ivorian Ministries of Defence, Interior and Justice provide full access for interviews to persons of interest for the Group of Experts, within the framework of its mandate.

Finance

172. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire continue to implement all measures necessary to combat the smuggling out of the country of agricultural products and natural resources.

173. The Group recommends that Government continue to implement all measures necessary to combat illicit checkpoints and illegal taxation systems throughout the country.

174. The Group recommends that the Government facilitate the Group's investigations by granting access to all necessary financial documents and ensuring that Ivorian-registered companies do likewise.

Customs and transport

175. The Group recommends that the UNOCI Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit include in its embargo-monitoring tasks the inspection of cargo aircraft and any transport vehicle using the ports, airports, airfields, military bases and border crossings of Côte d'Ivoire, as mandated in paragraph 2 (g) of resolution 1739 (2007), and that the Security Council reiterate this mandate in future resolutions extending the mandate of UNOCI.

176. The Group recommends that Ivorian customs authorities take the measures necessary to provide a container-scanning service for goods imported through the port of San Pedro.

177. The Group recommends that Ivorian customs authorities take the measures necessary to complete as soon as possible the training of the 2,000 ex-combatants to be assigned as customs officers.

Diamonds

178. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire make an explicit reference in every decree and administrative decision made by the Ivorian customs authorities regarding the obligation of Côte d'Ivoire to abide by the measures imposed by the Security Council on diamonds.

179. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire exercise the same due diligence on individuals and companies registered as diamond buyers that is required by the OECD guidelines for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, as required by paragraph 25 of resolution 2101 (2013). This due diligence includes, but is not limited to, asking individuals registered as diamond buyers to provide proof of the origin of their funds and asking companies to disclose the beneficial ownership and company structure. Those measures would supplement both the Kimberley Process and EITI, which have not been tasked with verifying how artisanal diamond miners finance their activities and which are thus unable to report undue profits coming from the pre-financing of artisanal diamond workers mentioned in paragraphs 151 and 152 above.

180. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire provide solid, verifiable guarantees that a credible, self-sustainable and transparent mechanism to stockpile rough diamonds is in place that will reasonably ensure that its diamond production cannot be exported outside the country in violation of the sanctions regime prior to putting in place systems that allow the internal purchase and sale of rough diamonds.

181. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, neighbouring States, ECOWAS and the Mano River Union cooperate closely in order to react properly and appropriately in detecting cross-border diamond smuggling and to cross-check data on a broader regional basis, thus enabling the verification of the statistics produced by those countries individually against those produced by the region as a whole.

182. The Group recommends that the relevant Ivorian authorities quickly move forward to the mirroring of databases created by the National Bureau of Expertise on solid and reputable external computer servers that feature adequate protection against intrusion and forgery.

183. The Group recommends that future EITI reports for Côte d'Ivoire reflect the contribution of the artisanal diamond-mining sector to the national treasury, which would enhance transparency regarding the origin and destination of revenues originating from the artisanal mining sector and eventually contribute to highlighting the revenues from that sector that escape State control and that can thus be used by armed groups or individuals to purchase arms and related materiel.

Individual sanctions

184. The Group recommends that all financial-related institutions in Côte d'Ivoire, including the tax and cadastral agency, BCEAO and all public and private banks and financial institutions take immediate measures to comply fully with the Security Council resolutions imposing targeted sanctions on Ivorian individuals, in particular the assets freeze, and that the Member States concerned inform the Committee accordingly.

185. The Group also recommends that the above-mentioned institutions grant it immediate and unrestricted access to all financial records pertaining to the individuals currently subject to sanctions, pursuant to paragraph 30 of Security Council resolution 2101 (2013).

186. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire conduct a comprehensive financial investigation of all assets and financial-related information pertaining to all the sanctioned individuals and share the results with the Group of Experts.

Annex 1

Meetings and consultations held by the Group of Experts in the course of its mandate

Belgium

Multilateral and bilateral entities

European Commission; Kimberley Process Working Group of Diamond Experts, Antwerp World Diamond Centre, Belgian Federal Police

Côte d'Ivoire

Government

Prime Minister; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of the Interior; Ministry of Economy and Finance; Ministry of Public Function; Ministry of Industry and Mines; Ministry of Transport; Ministry of Justice; General Directorate of Customs; Autorité de Régulation du Coton et de l'Anacarde, Direction générale du Trésor — Bouaké, Kimberley Process Secretariat; Société pour le Développement Minier de la Côte d'Ivoire (SODEMI); Service d'Expertise et d'Evaluation des Pierres et Metaux Précieux (SEEPMP)

Diplomatic missions

Embassy of France, Embassy of the United States, European Union Delegation

Multilateral and bilateral entities

United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

France

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs


Annex 2**Table of small-calibre ammunition profile found in Côte d'Ivoire****Methodology adopted by the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**




This report profiles small calibre ammunition in the national stockpile of Côte d'Ivoire.

A specific focus is put on the countries and years of production of this ammunition. The profile shows that the ammunition was produced in over 20 countries in a period of 60 years, contains ammunition produced in states not usually associated with ammunition found in conflict and post-conflict settings in Africa, and includes calibres from both "Western"- and "Eastern"-bloc states. It also considers types of ammunition transfers to Côte d'Ivoire and sources thereof. It argues that the profile can assist international and national stakeholders in identifying illicit ammunition flows to and from Côte d'Ivoire as well as the broader region.

This report is based on research by the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit (IEMU) of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) from late 2011 to early 2013. It is complemented with findings of the UN Groups of Experts who monitor the implementation of the arms embargo on Côte d'Ivoire. The photos and data on ammunition found in Côte d'Ivoire was collected by UNOCI in events including inspections of national defence and security installations, the disarmament of former combatants and civilians, and recovery of ammunition from arms caches and sites of armed attacks during the aforementioned period. The work entailed the visual inspection of several tens of thousands of individual rounds of small calibre ammunition and the systematic recording of their calibres, markings on cartridge cases, and, where available, markings on packaging.

Small calibre ammunition is understood here as ammunition with a calibre of 14.5mm or less. This corresponds to small arms and light weapons covering machine and sub-machine guns, automatic and semi-automatic rifles, and pistols, that is, arms and weapons that featured prominently in the Ivorian crisis between late 2002 and early 2011. The national ammunition stockpile is understood here to cover state-controlled ammunition stocks as well as ammunition in (illicit) possession of former combatants and civilians. The countries of production of the ammunition are mainly identified on the basis of internationally recognised producer codes on the documented ammunition. The consistency of markings on documented ammunition with markings that are known to be in use in the producing country has further been verified with international experts in the field of ammunition identification.

Calibre	Country/ Factory code(s)	Year(s) of production	Headstamp markings, examples
Calibre 5.45x39mm			
	Romania		
	325	1990	
	Soviet Union (Kyrgyzstan)		
	60	1981	
	Soviet Union (Ukraine)		
	270	1981	
Calibre 5.56x45mm			
	Belgium		
	FNB	1993	
	Czech Republic		
	S&B	2002	
	France		
	LM	1991; 1990; 1988	
	SF	1987; 1985; 1983; 1982; 1978	

Israel			
IMI	2002, 2001		
TZ	1983		
TZZ	2001; 1998; 1993; 1990		
Portugal			
FNM	1991; 1988; 1983; 1977		
South Africa			
14*	1994; 1993		
*Projectile type			
15*	1995		
*Projectile type			
United States of America			
WCC	1964		



Calibre 7.5x54mm




France				
LM	1968; 1960			
SF	1985; 1979; 1978; 1975; 1973; 1972; 1970; 1969; 1968			
TE	1967; 1962			
VE	1959			

Calibre 7.62x25mm



Bulgaria				
10	1955; 1954			
Soviet Union (Russia)				
38	1984; 1982			
539	1950; 1949; 1948			



Calibre 7.62x39mm


Bangladesh			
BOF	2003		
Bulgaria			
10	2002; 2000; 1999		
China			
61	2002; 2001; 1998; 1997		
71 (Blank cartridges for training)	1995		
311	2006; 2002; 1999		
661	1968		
811	1994		



Czech Republic / Czechoslovakia			
bxn	2001; 1988; 1986; 1980; 1977; 1973		
S&B	<i>Not known</i>		
Iran			
<i>None present</i>	2002; 2001		
Hungary			
23	1980; 1979		
Poland			
21	1994; 1988		





Romania			
323	1998		
325	2005		
SADU	2007		
Soviet Union (Kyrgyzstan)			
60	1996; 1981; 1975; 1973; 1966; 1965; 1963; 1962; 1955; 1953; 1952; 1951; 1950		
Soviet Union (Russia)			
3	1973; 1969; 1965; 1953; 1952; 1951; 1950; 1949		
17	1965; 1961; 1953; 1951		
539	1989; 1983; 1976; 1975; 1972; 1970; 1965; 1964; 1962; 1960; 1958; 1957; 1956; 1954; 1952; 1951; 1950; 1949		






	711	1980; 1966; 1964; 1962; 1961; 1958		
	Soviet Union (Ukraine)			
	270	1975; 1973; 1971; 1970; 1965; 1964; 1963; 1959; 1955; 1954; 1953; 1952; 1951; 1950		
	Sudan			
	SU	2001		
	1*	2011; 2010; 2004		
	*Likely cartridge case production lot			
	2*	2009		
	*Likely cartridge case production lot			
	3*	2009; 2003		
	*Likely cartridge case production lot			
	4*	2003		
	*Likely cartridge case production lot			
	Yugoslavia (Serbia)			
	ПЛУ	2002		



Zimbabwe			
ZI	1992		
Not known			
ST	2002; 1999; 1997		
Not marked			
Possibly Sudanese	Not known		







Calibre 7.62x51mm			
Belgium			
FNB	1984		
Bulgaria			
10	1970		
France			
LM	1971		



Portugal			
FNM	1986		
South Africa			
13*	1996; 1994	 	
*Projectile type			
23*	1997		
*Projectile type			
GRI M1*	1978		
*Projectile type			
R1 M1*	1978		
*Projectile type			
Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina)			
IK	1985		
Calibre 7.62x54Rmm			
Bulgaria			
10	2000; 1996; 1986	 	

China			
61	2002		
Czech Republic / Czechoslovakia			
S&B	<i>Not known</i>		
Iran			
Not present	2002; 2001; 2000		
Soviet Union (Kyrgyzstan)			
60	1974		
Soviet Union (Russia)			
188	1983; 1972; 1971; 1970; 1969; 1966; 1964		
Sudan			
1*	2011		
*Likely cartridge case production lot			
4*	2003		
*Likely cartridge case production lot			

Yugoslavia (Serbia)			
ИИТ	2003; 2001		
<i>Not marked</i>			
Possibly Sudanese	Not known		
Calibre 9x19mm			
Czech Republic / Czechoslovakia			
S&B	Not known		
Egypt			
Factory #27, Arabic script	1972		
France			
GEVELOT	Not known		
SF	1990; 1986; 1976; 1973; 1972		
TS	1963; 1952		

Hungary			
GECO*	Not known		
*Hungarian copy of German stamp			
Israel			
IMI	Not known		
Portugal			
FNM	1993; 1988		
South Africa			
15*	1997; 1995		
*Projectile type			
PMP	Not known		
Yugoslavia (Serbia)			
ПМТ	1978		
Calibre 12.7x99mm			
France			
SF	1977; 1970		

	TE	1986		
	<i>Not known</i>			
	ST	1996		
Calibre 12.7x108mm				
	China			
	41	2010; 1995	 	
	Iran			
	<i>Not present</i>	2003; 2002	 	
	Soviet Union (Russia)			
	3	1972; 1952	 	
	188	1990; 1988; 1971	 	
Calibre 14.5x114mm				
	China			
	41	2009; 1990; 1974	 	

	Poland		
	21	1987	
	Soviet Union (Russia)		
	3	1981; 1976; 1962; 1959; 1956; 1948	
	17	1985	

Annex 3

Soldiers not integrated in the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire

Interview of Commander Issiaka Ouattara (a.k.a. Wattao) —
Centre de Coordination des Décisions Opérationnelles (CCDO)



Issiaka Ouattara dit Wattao : « Le patron du CCDO, c'est moi ! »

<http://www.lavoixdugolf.net/interview-385-1.html#.UjA8UBY6dt0>

Extrait :

« On vous reproche aussi de mettre tous vos éléments dans le CCDO, y compris même ceux qui sont sans matricule :

Des éléments dont on vous parle, ce sont les meilleurs de mes éléments. Ils sont prêts à aller au charbon. Ils réalisent un excellent boulot. Toutes les actions réussies par le CCDO sont à leur actif. S'agissant de leur matricule, je suis en discussion avec le chef d'état major pour étudier le cas de ces centaines éléments. Ce que vous devez savoir, c'est qu'il y a beaucoup d'éléments qui trichent avec le travail. Et moi je suis contre ce boycott que je dénonce d'ailleurs. Comprenez une fois pour toute que ce sont ces militaires qu'on qualifie de sans matricule qui assurent la sécurité des millions d'Abidjanais. Il faut donc les saluer et les féliciter. Je suis fier d'eux ».


Annex 4**Non-lethal grenade launchers and related 37/38-mm or 40-mm ammunition manufactured by Condor Non-Lethal Technology (registered in Brazil)**

Launcher for non-lethal grenades, caliber 37/38 mm


Model: AM-600

Serial number: C 7245 BR/09

Produced in 2009



Various types of 37/38-mm and 40-mm ammunition




[Produced in August 2012]

Launcher for non-lethal grenades, caliber 40 mm

Model: AM-640

Serial number: C 4032 BR/12

Produced in 2012



Annex 5

**Materiel from Condor Non-Lethal Technologies —
end-user certificate**

PRESIDENCE DU FASO
ETAT-MAJOR PARTICULIER



BURKINA FASO
Unité - Progrès - Justice


N° 2012/ **0023** /PRES/EMPPE

CONFIDENTIEL

CERTIFICAT DE DESTINATION FINALE

1. Nous, soussigné, Général de brigade Gilbert **DIENDERE**, Chef de l'Etat-major Particulier de la Présidence du Faso, certifions par la présente que les matériels de **CONDOR SA. QUIMICA**, ci-après désignés en annexe, appartiennent au Burkina Faso et lui sont exclusivement destinés.
2. Ces matériels ne seront ni expédiés, ni cédés à une tierce partie sans l'autorisation préalable du gouvernement brésilien.
3. En foi de quoi la présente attestation est établie pour servir et valoir ce que de droit.

Quandou, le 29 février 2012.



ANNEXE

REFERENCE : N° 0023 / PRES/EMPPF DU 26 JAN. 2012

N°	REFERENCE DU PRODUIT	DESCRIPTION DU PRODUIT	QUANTITE
1	AM-600	37/38 mm-Lanceur de Munition Non-Létales	350
2	AM-640	Lanceur de Munitions 40 mm	350
3	GL-201 37/38 mm	37/38 mm Projectile de Moyenne Portée Lacrymogène (CS)	1.000
4	AM-500	Grenade d'entraînement	1.000
5	GL-302	Grenade lacrymogène à Emission Elevée (CS)	700
6	GL-304	Grenade Outdoor à Effet Moral	700
7	GL-305	Grenade Outdoor Lacrymogène (CS)	700
8	GL-307	Grenade à Lumière et Son	700
9	GL-309	Grenade à Emission Lacrymogène-Rubberball (CS)	700
10	GL-310	Grenade Lacrymogène à Mouvements aléatoires (CS)	700
11	MB-502	HC-Grenade Fumigène	700
12	MB-900	Grenade Offensive	700
13	SS-601/AZ	Grenade Fumigène Colorée (Bleu)	700



CONDOR S/A
INDUSTRIA QUIMICA RUA ARMANDO SAES
PERSUA N 100 ADOLEFOPOLIS
NOVA IGUAÇU CEP08610-361
R.J. BRASIL

COMMERCIAL INVOICE No 043/2013

DATE: August 20th, 2013

CONDOR S/A		N.E.B TRANS		PRESIDENCIA DU FASO	
09 BP 585 OURAGADOUNGOU 88 BURKINA FASO TEL: +226 58 38 87 41		28 Rue, Tervilieu Moon No 208 Quartier RLOUIN - Abidjan Près de FUCOG - TOGO 11 B.P. 26 Lomé - TOGO E-mail: info@nebtrans.com Cell: (+228) 96 04 34 20 / (+228) 96 49 13 94 Fax: (+228) 23 71 11 36 E-mail: (+228) 23 71 43 78		ETAT-MAJOR PARTICULIER BURKINA FASO	
DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	Ref.	USD	QUANTITY	UNIT PRICE (€)	TOTAL PRICE (€)
3758 mm - Lameau de Mursilou Non-Litelle	A48-600	8301.20.00	270	€ 301.20	€ 270.540.30
40 mm Lameau de Mursilou	A48-640	8301.20.00	270	€ 940.00	€ 254.040.00
3758 mm Propriété de Moyenne Poutre Lacrymogène (CS)	CL-301	36.04.00.00	830	€ 39.90	€ 34.899.00
Grenade d'entraînement	A48-620	3604.00.00	630	€ 39.77	€ 33.039.10
Grenade Lacrymogène à Emission Étendue (CS)	CL-302	3604.00.00	350	€ 53.41	€ 34.875.50
Grenade Outdoor à Effet Moral	CL-304	3604.00.00	940	€ 30.28	€ 27.953.72
Grenade Outdoor Lacrymogène (CS)	CL-305	3604.00.00	590	€ 52.48	€ 30.899.00
Grenade Outdoor à Lumière et Son	CL-307	3604.00.00	030	€ 88.07	€ 21.959.50
Grenade à Emission Lacrymogène - Rubberball (CS)	CL-308	3604.00.00	030	€ 44.94	€ 24.440.00
Grenade Lacrymogène à Mouvements Aléatoires (CS)	CL-310	3604.00.00	030	€ 66.85	€ 35.757.50
HC - Grenade Fumigène	M48-662	3604.00.00	030	€ 72.45	€ 35.899.50
Grenade Offensive	M48-660	3604.00.00	030	€ 38.88	€ 16.324.00
Grenade Fumigène Colorée (Bleue)	M48-661/142	3604.00.00	030	€ 55.80	€ 36.190.00
TOTAL FOB				€	915.635.12
SEA FREIGHT				€	39.099.85
INSURANCE				€	1.569.60
TOTAL CIF - LOMÉ, TOGO				€	946.807.12
DOCUMENTARY CREDIT NUMBER					
CIC1200000					
Date of Issue: 12/08/13					
DESCRIPTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES					
MATERIALS OF LAW AND ORDER MAINTAINING AS PRO FORMA INVOICE NR 046 / 042 DATED ON 05TH MAY 2013, CIF LOMÉ, INCOTERMS 2010					

Payment
Shipment

Ricardo Sauter
Commercial Director

According to Letter of Credit number CIC1200000
December 2012

REPUBLIQUE DE COTE D'IVOIRE

Union - Solidarité - Travail

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE

DIRECTION DU GENIE ET DES EQUIPEMENTS MILITAIRES

**REGLEMENT PARTICULIER D'APPEL D'OFFRES
(R.P.A.O.)**

**LA FOURNITURE DE DIX (10) CANOTS
PNEUMATIQUES
AU MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE**

PIECE N°0

EXR CICE 2012

Page 9 sur 44

Présidence de la République

Ministre auprès du Président de la République,
chargé de la Défense

Direction du Génie et des
Equipements Militaires

N° 746 /PR/MPRCD/DGEM

République de Côte d'Ivoire

Union - Discipline - Travail



Abidjan, le 23 NOV 2012

A

Madame la Directrice
de l'entreprise MAGFORCE IVOIRE
01 BP 11809 ABIDJAN 01

Objet : Notification d'attribution de lot.

Références : Avis de non objection N°2640/2012/MEF/DGBF/DMP/33 du 07/11/2012

Madame la Directrice,

Suite à l'appel d'offres N° F 341/2012 ayant pour objet la fourniture de dix (10) canots pneumatiques au Ministère de la Défense, nous avons l'honneur de vous notifier que votre entreprise a été sélectionnée pour fournir le lot suivant :


LOT 2: Canot pneumatique de 09 places

Par conséquent, nous vous demandons de prendre toutes les dispositions utiles pour l'exécution de la commande dès que le marché vous sera notifié conformément aux articles 77 à 81 du code des marchés publics et de produire un exemplaire des documents suivants datant de moins de six (06) mois :

- Une (01) déclaration CNPS
- Une (01) attestation fiscale
- Un (01) cautionnement définitif

Veuillez agréer, Madame la Directrice, l'expression de mon profond respect.

MagForce Boulevard du Gabon
01 BP 11 809
Abidjan 01
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
RC: 0812-2012-0-10586
Tél: 022 22 22 18 53



1.451281

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE
ABIDJAN
REPUBLIQUE DE CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Contact : COLONEL OKIE
TEL 225 01 05 01 91

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE
ABIDJAN
REPUBLIQUE DE CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Contact : COLONEL OKIE
TEL 225 01 05 01 91

2007

1992

Panel 1

1998

Place of delivery

Starts and numbers

Number and kind of participants

TAL

FBL

30ME30032S

FR

NEGOTIABLE FIATA
MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
BILL OF LADING

must subject to LACTATION Rules for
Multistate Transport Documents (OC Publication 412)



TRU 383979/4
Serial 000852

3 PALETTES DISANT CONTENIR
8 COLIS DE CANOT PNEUMATIQUE

948 HSC

FRET PAYE / FREIGHT PREPAID
ON BOARD LE 21/02/13

NECOTRANS AATA

ALL MATCH SQUARE / CAT 3 - 2nd Reg

2. Signature _____

72718, REGION NORMANDE LA VALLEE CEDEX 4

Tel 01 64 66 26 16 - Fax 01 64 66 24 54

According to the declaration of the contractor

Declaration of interest of the consignee in timely delivery (Clause 6.2.)

Declared value for all veterans rate according to the declaration of the consignor (Clause 7 and 8)

The goods and instructions are accepted and dealt with subject to the Standard Conditions printed overleaf

Taken in charge in apparent good order and condition, unless otherwise noted herein, at the place of receipt for transport and delivery as mentioned above.

One of these Multimodal Transport Bills of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods. In Witness whereof the original Multimodal Transport Bill of Lading all of this tenor and date have been signed in the number stated below, one of which being accomplished the others to be void.

Freight amount	Freight payable at ROUEN	Place and date of issue SERRIS LE 21/02/2013
Cargo Insurance through the undersigned ☐ not covered ☐ Covered according to attached Policy	Number of Original FBL's 3 / THREE	Item NEGOTRANS AATA
For delivery of goods please apply to: GETMA CI 32 BP 3298 ABIDJAN 32 / tel 225 34 71 13 48		ARLINGTON SQUARE - 1st & 2nd floor 200 Madison Avenue 77718 SERRIS MARNE LA VALLEE CEDEX 4 226 94 64 00 20 18 - Fax 01 64 68 34 00

Annex 7

**Body armour items, supplied by the company Plasan Sasa Ltd.
(registered in Israel)**



[Note the mention of Plasan and Horsforth T. Ltd]

923 TLV 0208 2006

Shipper's Name and Address
PLASAN SASA
KIBUTZ SASA
SASA
KIBUTZ SASA 13870
ISRAEL

Shipper's Account Number

Air Waybill CORSAIR

Issued by

Capitales 1, 2 and 3 of this Air Waybill are originals and have the same validity.

It is agreed that the goods described herein are shipped in accordance with the contract on the reverse hereof. ALL GOODS MAY BE CARRIED BY ANY OTHER MEANS INCLUDING ROAD OR ANY OTHER CARRIER UNLESS SPECIFIC CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN HEREON BY THE SHIPPER. AND SHIPPER AGREES THAT THE SHIPMENT MAY BE CARRIED VIA INTERMEDIATE STOPPING PLACES WHICH THE CARRIER DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THE SHIPPER'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Shipper may increase such limitation of liability by entering a higher value for carriage and paying a supplemental charge if required.

Consignee's Name and Address
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
PRESIDENCY OF REPUBLICUE
OFFICE, REPUBLICAN FORCES OF COTE
D'IVOIRE, PLACE DE LA
REPUBLIQUE, PLATEAU ABIDJAN 01

Consignee's Account Number

Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City
ISRAEL CARGO LOGISTICS (ICL) LTD.
LOD 70100, P.O. B 1100, ISRAEL
T: +972-39777333 F: +972-39777334

Accounting Information

Agent's IATA Code
37-4-7080

Address No.

Address No. - City

Reference No. - City

By First Carrier
CDG EL AL

To
ABIDJAN

By Second Carrier
ABJ SS

By Third Carrier
USD PPX

By Fourth Carrier
X

By Fifth Carrier
NVD

By Sixth Carrier
NCV

Amount of Insurance
XXX

Insurance - If carrier offers insurance, and with insurance is requested in accordance with the conditions thereof, indicate amount to be insured in Rupees in box marked "Amount of Insurance".

Notify Party
Notify: COTE D'IVOIRE ATTN: CHEIKHOU DANIEL PHONE: 225-48081877 FAX: (225) 39931911 E-MAIL: horsforth.trader@gmail.com

For VGM and/or other requirements, including a requirement to be entered into the United States by the shipper, refer to the carrier's website for the latest requirements. Shipment subject to VGM for export.

No. of Pieces or Packages	Gross Weight kg	Net Weight kg	Chargeable Weight kg	Rate per kg	Charge Total	Remarks and Quantity of Goods (Unit Dimensions or Volume)
18	5,186.00		5,186.00	4.98	25,826.28	BULLETPROOF VEST DIM: 16(110X110X120)CMS AS VOL 3030.000 KGS 21.7800 CBM Inv. No: 880521
18	5,186.00		5,186.00		25,826.28	

Weight
26826.28

Volume
21.7800 CBM

Weight
4,168.80

Volume
26826.28

FUEL FEE 3,370.90 SECURITY FEE 777.90
CG 10.00

ISRAEL CARGO LOGISTICS (ICL) LTD / GERY
MIFODIN
REF: 72485 JOB: 72485

Signature of Shipper or its Agent

07.03.13 TEL-AVIV ISRAEL CARGO
LOGISTICS (ICL) LTD

Signature of Issuing Carrier or its Agent


923-0208 2006

COPY 8 (FOR AGENT)

[Note the mention of the e-mail address: horsforth.trader@gmail.com]

Annex 8

Military equipment supplied by E&C Technology Limited (registered in China)



E&C TECHNOLOGY LIMITED
Rooms 1102-1103, 11/F., Kowloon Building,
555 Nathan Road, Mong Kok, Kowloon, Hong Kong

PACKING LIST

CONTRACT NO. EC2012-08C1 INVOICE NO. EC2013-RW-01
COMMODITY: SOCKS WATER BACKPACK SHOES RAINCOAT DATE: 28-Jan-12

STYLE	Description	CTNS	Quantity Pairs	G.W(KGS)	N.W(KGS)	VOLUME(m³)
C1009S	Socks	397	40000	5600	5200	20.85
C1009T	Shoes	1667	20000	38341	30008	228.12
CTX-001	Water Backpack	40	1000	560	520	3.94
CTX-002	Water Backpack	8	200	112	104	0.77
CTX-003	Raincoat	67	1000	1575	1508	3.25
CTX-004	Raincoat	14	200	329	315	0.68

PACKED IN 2,193 CARTONS ONLY

GROSS WEIGHT 46,517 KGS

NET WEIGHT 37,653 KGS

TOTAL VOLUME 287.610 M³

For and on behalf of
E&C TECHNOLOGY LIMITED

No.	Type	Style	Containers	Quantity	Weight (kg)
1	Socks	C1009S	397	40000	5600
2	Shoes	C1009T	1667	20000	38341
3	Water Backpack	CTX-001	40	1000	560
4	Water Backpack	CTX-002	8	200	112
5	Raincoat	CTX-003	67	1000	1575
6	Raincoat	CTX-004	14	200	329

64/961

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



Annex 9

Ammunition with characteristics similar to Sudanese production

120-mm mortar rounds




[120-mm mortar rounds manufactured in the Sudan in 2011;
01-11-116: Lot 01, production: 2011, factory code: 116 (Sudan)]




[Ignition cartridge in crate: SUD (Sudan), 2005]

60-mm mortar rounds



[60-mm mortar rounds manufactured in the Sudan in 2008;
03-08-116: Lot 3, production 2008, factory code: 116 (Sudan)]




[Ignition cartridge in crate: 937 (China), 2006]

Annex 10

Unmarked 7.62x54-mm ammunition



Yellow neck sealant




Red primer sealant




Annex 11


Ammunition with characteristics similar to Chinese production







[Yarmouk Industrial Complex, Sudan; contract number 09XSD14E01YIC/SU]



Annex 12

Customs administrative decisions

KRM/AMM
MINISTRE DE L'ECONOMIE
ET DES FINANCES

REPUBLIQUE DE COTE D'IVOIRE
Union - Discipline - Travail

Direction Générale des Douanes



CIRCULAIRE N° 1483 - /MEF/DGD/DU 17 JUNE **(DIFFUSION GENERALE)**

OBJET : Interdiction relative aux exportations de la noix de cajou par les frontières terrestres.

Réf : - Courrier n° 015/MINAGRI/CAB/ARECA/du 20/05/11
- Courrier n° 0347/MEF/CAB-2/NNY du 25/05/11
- Courrier n° 25/DE/ARECA-11 du 10/05/11.

Il me revient que certains opérateurs économiques ont profité du contexte de la crise socio-politique pour procéder à l'exportation, par voie routière, de noix de cajou.

Malgré le retour du pays à la normalité, ces opérateurs semblent persister dans cette pratique qui, non seulement constitue une source d'évasion fiscale, mais menace également la survie de la filière anacarde.

C'est pourquoi, et en vue d'y mettre fin, j'ai l'honneur de rappeler à l'ensemble du service et des usagers qu'aux termes de la réglementation en vigueur, **l'exportation des noix de cajou a lieu obligatoirement par les voies aérienne et maritime.**

A cet égard, les déclarations d'exportation desdits produits ~~ne peuvent être établies qu'après des Bureaux compétents d'Abidjan et San-Pedro.~~

ABVADH
MINISTÈRE DE L'ECONOMIE
ET DES FINANCES

REPUBLIQUE DE CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Union - Discipline - Travail

Direction Générale des Douanes



CIRCULAIRE N° 1497 / MEF/DGD/DU 29 AOU 2011
(DIFFUSION GENERALE)

OBJET: Recevabilité des déclarations d'exportation de noix de cajou

Réf : Circulaire n°1483 du 17 juin 2011 portant interdiction relative aux exportations de la noix de cajou par les frontières terrestres

Il me revient que ma circulaire n° 1483 du 17 juin 2011, citée en référence, rencontre des difficultés d'application, liées notamment à l'obligation de production du bordereau inter cajou, prescrite comme une condition de recevabilité de la déclaration à l'exportation.

Cette mesure, dictée par un souci de sécurisation de la filière anacarde, engendre en effet de nombreux abus, préjudiciables aux exportateurs et aux intérêts du Trésor Public.

En conséquence, et pour y remédier, j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à l'ensemble du service et des usagers, que la production du bordereau inter cajou ne constitue plus, désormais, une condition de recevabilité de la déclaration d'exportation des noix de cajou.


Toutefois, les dispositions relatives à l'interdiction de l'exportation de la noix de cajou par les frontières terrestres, demeurent en vigueur.

J'attache du prix au strict respect des dispositions de la présente qui est d'application immédiate.

Ampliations :

- MEF/Cab
- DG ECONOMIE
- FEDERAR
- GPEX
- CSECE
- PNECE
- UORCE
- Chanc. Coe & Industrie
- PAA
- BRACI
- CUC
- Synd. des Trava. n/s BOLLONG
- Synd. Nat. Des Transitaires
- SIVAC
- Toutes Directions Douanes

LE DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL DES DOUANES



Col-Maj. Issa COULIBALY

Annex 13

List of customs office heads

Service
BUREAU DE LA DOCUMENTATION
BUREAU SCANNER
BUREAU DU TRANSIT ET DES ACQUITS
BUREAU DE CONTROLE DES ENTREPRISES INDUSTRIELLES
BUREAU ANNEXE DU CONTROLE DOUANIER POSTAL DE BOUAKE
BUREAU ANNEXE GESTOCI DE YAMOUSSOUKRO
BUREAU ANNEXE MARCHÉ DE GROS DE BOUAKE
BUREAU ANNEXE SITARAIL BOUAKE
BUREAU BASE DE DONNÉES VALEURS ET DE LA RECONCILIATION

Service
BUREAU CENTRAL DE BOUAKE
BUREAU COORDINATION, AUDIT ET ÉCOUTE CLIENTS
BUREAU COURRIER ET ARCHIVES
BUREAU DE CONTROLE DES RÉGIMES DOUANIERS DE DROIT COMMUN
BUREAU DE CONTROLE DES RÉGIMES ÉCONOMIQUES ET SPÉCIAUX
BUREAU DE LA COOPÉRATION ET DE L'ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATIVE
BUREAU DE LA COOPÉRATION MULTILATÉRALE ET DES RÈGLES D'ORIGINES
BUREAU DE LA FORMATION CONTINUE
BUREAU DE LA LEGISLATION ET DE LA VALEUR

Service
BUREAU DE LA QUALITE ADMINISTRATIVE ET DES OPERATIONS
BUREAU DE L'ACTION SOCIALE ET DES PERSPECTIVES
BUREAU DE L'ANALYSE DES RISQUES
BUREAU DE L'ENCADREMENT MILITAIRE
BUREAU DE L'EVALUATION
BUREAU DE L'IMMOBILIER ET DU MATERIEL ROULANT
BUREAU DE SUIVI DU RECouvreMENT
BUREAU DELEGUE A LA DIRECTION DES SERVICES EXTERIEURS DU NORD
BUREAU DELEGUE A LA DIRECTION DES SERVICES EXTERIEURS DU SUD
BUREAU DES ANALYSES STATISTIQUES

Service
BUREAU DES ARCHIVES DE LA DED
BUREAU DES DONNEES DU PERSONNEL
BUREAU DES DOUANES ABIDJAN PORT
BUREAU DES DOUANES AEROPORT FHB
BUREAU DES DOUANES D'ASSUEFRY X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE BIANOUAN X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE BOGBO X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE DJOUROUTOU X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE FRAMBO X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GRAPLEU X

Service
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GBELEKAN X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GINTA X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GRABO X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE LA ZONE FRANCHE DE GRAND BASSAM
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE MINIGNAN X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE NIABLE X

Service
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE NOE X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE OUANGOLODOUGOU - SITARAIL X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE OUANGOLODOUGOU - TERRESTRIE X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE OUANINOU ET BOOKO DELOCALISES A TOUBA X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE POGO X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE PROLLO X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE SAN-PEDRO X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE SIPILOU X

Somme
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GBELEKAN
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GINTA
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GRABO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE LA ZONE FRANCHE DE GRAND BASSAM
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE MINIGNAN
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE NIABLE
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE NOE
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE OUANGOLODOUGOU - SITARAIL
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE OUANGOLODOUGOU - TERRESTRIE
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE OUANINOU ET BOOKO DELOCALISES A TOUBA
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE POGO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE PROLLO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE SAN-PEDRO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE SIPILOU
Total global

Service	
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE MRANA	X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE SONKO	X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE TANKRO	X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE TIEFINZO	X
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE TRANSLA	X
BUREAU DES DOUANES D'WILABOORO	X
BUREAU DES ENTREPRISES DE COMMERCE ET DE SERVICE	
BUREAU DES ENVOIS EXPRESS ET POSTAUX	

Service
BUREAU DES EQUIPEMENTS MILITAIRES ET DES FOURNITURES (ou BUREAU MATERIEL ET FOURNITURES DE BUREAU)
BUREAU DES ETUDES ECONOMIQUES
BUREAU DES EXAMERATIONS DE LA SOUS-DIRECTION DES TECHNIQUES DOUANIERES
BUREAU DES POURSUITES DE LA SOUS-DIRECTION DU CONTENTIEUX ET DES AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES
BUREAU DES POURSUITES ET DU RECOURS DE LA DIRECTION DES ENQUETES DOUANIERES
BUREAU DES REGIMES ECONOMIQUES DE LA SOUS-DIRECTION DES TECHNIQUES DOUANIERES
BUREAU DES REGIMES PARTICULIERS
BUREAU DES STATISTIQUES DU COMMERCE EXTERIEUR
BUREAU DEVELOPPEMENT ET MAINTENANCE DES APPLICATIONS
BUREAU DU BUDGET
BUREAU DU GUICHET UNIQUE AUTOMOBILES (part.)

Service
BUREAU INFO CENTRE 1
BUREAU INFRASTRUCTURE ET TELECOMMUNICATION
BUREAU NATIONAL DE LIAISON ET DE RENSEIGNEMENT DE LA DIRECTION DES ENQUETES DOUANIERES
BUREAU ORGANISATION ET GESTION DU PERSONNEL
BUREAU PORT DE PECHE ABIDJAN PORT
BUREAU PROJETS DE LA SOUS-DIRECTION DES ETUDES ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT
BUREAU PROTOCOLE, ACCUEIL ET RELATIONS PUBLIQUES
BUREAU REGIONAL DE RENFORCEMENT DE L'OMD POUR L'AFRIQUE DE OCCIDENTALE ET CENTRALE
BUREAU STATISTIQUE DE L'ACTIVITE DOUANIERE.

Service
BUREAU DU GUICHET UNIQUE AUTOMOBILES DE BOUAKE
BUREAU DU RECOUVREMENT ET DES RECETTES DE LA DM
BUREAU DU RECOUVREMENT, DE GESTION DES AMENDES ET DES PRIMES
BUREAU DU RENSEIGNEMENT
BUREAU DU SUIVI DES AFFAIRES CONTENTIEUSES
BUREAU DU SUIVI DES MARCHANDISES SANS DECLARATION (AEROPORT)
BUREAU DU SUIVI DES MARCHANDISES SANS DECLARATIONS ABIDJAN NORD
BUREAU DU TARIF DE LA SOUS DIRECTION DE LA LEGISLATION ET DU TARIF
BUREAU DU TRANSIT DE LA SOUS-DIRECTION DE LA COOPERATION INTERNATIONALE ET DE L'ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATIVE
BUREAU EXPLOITATION
BUREAU EXPORT

Annex 14

List of customs border offices

LISTE DES CHEFS DES BUREAUX FRONTIERES DE LA DIRECTION GENERALE DES DOUANES

SERVICES
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE TAKIKRO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE NIABLE
BUREAU DES DOUANES D'EBILASSOKRO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE SOKO
BUREAU DES DOUANES D'ASSUEFRY
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE TRANSUA
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE NOE
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE FRAMBO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE BIANOUA
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GRABO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE PROLO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE DJOUROUTOU
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE POGO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE OUANGOLO SITARAIL
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GBINTA
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GBAPLEU
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE SIPILOU
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE OUANINOU ET BOOKO DELOCALISES A TOUBA
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE BOOKO
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE GBELEBAN
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE SIRANA
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE MINIGNAN
BUREAU DES DOUANES DE TIEFINZO